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South America is intertwined with the interests of accumulating pow-
er and wealth in the two largest centers of power in the world: the United 
States and China. They carry out a dispute for the monopoly control of their 
markets and of the sources of strategic natural resources, incorporating the 
region in a gravitational center of the functioning and expansion of the sys-
tem. Thus, economic and political pressures are growing, both internally and 
externally, allowing for a South American revaluation and Chinese-American 
expansion.
 In the 21st century, power projects in South America constitute an 
arena of disputes that comprise a dialectical correlation between Internal and 
External Political Forces. In this sense, this article aims to conduct an inno-
vative debate based on the theoretical formulation called Competitive-Coop-
erative Triangles of Power, taking the South American region as a case study. 
From a realist view of international relations and using an empirical-deduc-
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tive methodology, the objective is to achieve an epistemological construction 
regarding power in the international system, explaining the challenges and 
possibilities of the South American Internal Political Forces.
 The article is organized into two sections, in addition to this introduc-
tion and the final considerations: in the first, an elucidation of the theoretical 
formulation of the Internal Political Forces and the External Political Forces 
will be carried out, and how they interact reciprocally in the South Ameri-
can geopolitical and geoeconomic context. The second section is divided into 
three parts: first, brief comments on power in international relations will be 
defined; subsequently, the central objective of the conceptual definition of 
competitive-cooperative triangles will be presented; in the last part, a demon-
stration of empirical cases of this new epistemological formulation in South 
America is proposed. 
Power projects for South America - Internal Political Forces 
(IPF) and External Political Forces (EPF)
The Internal Political Forces (IPF): exogenist privatism, seasonal 
hybridism and popular nationalism
First, it is of fundamental importance to conceptually define Inter-
nal Political Forces (IPF). According to Rodrigues (2020a, 121, our transla-
tion), they are defined as “groups that aim at power, dominance or influence 
from the establishment of centripetal forces, impelling agents to approach 
the center around which they move”. In other words, IPF are capable of pro-
ducing or accelerating political movements, determining the displacement 
of agents through a consensus that gives rise to specific social and political 
action, according to its principles. Therefore, they are powers fractured by 
dissent, whose endogenous capacity to influence the power blocks is exer-
cised among the actors that make up the system, given that one of the main 
characteristics of the contemporary world is the war between capital blocks.
 Fiori accurately summarizes the central point for the analysis of Inter-
nal Political Forces:
In all cases of economic success, the existence of a united and cohesive 
strategic nucleus within the state itself is also identified, which was largely 
responsible for defining and sustaining strategic objectives that remain 
constant for a long time, despite possible changes in government or political 
regime. These nuclei, or centers of power, always demonstrate - in all cases 
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studied - great flexibility and great capacity in the configuration of the 
power system in which they are inserted (Fiori 2014, 40, our translation).
First, it is important to emphasize that the IPF models, which will 
be presented later, cannot be considered hermetic and unmoved by internal 
contradictions. They constitute the search for the delimitation of an object of 
research based on empirical and historical observation, a concept that aims 
to highlight a representative project of certain social sectors, built under an 
interpretation of concrete reality. In addition, they conform to medium-long 
term trends and, therefore, are subject to a more lasting and reliable analysis.
Second, it is necessary to clarify that the Internal Political Forces are 
present in all countries of the world system, given the impossibility of the 
existence of harmony of power vis-à-vis power disputes. However, it is note-
worthy that the conception of these IPF consists of a specific empirical and 
materialistic observation, related to the study of South America in the 21st 
century. These forces define a power geometry determined in a spatial and 
historical way, which does not, in particular, make it impossible to verify these 
Internal Political Forces in other regions of the world, or other conceptions in 
different historical periods.
A third point is the acknowledgement that the constitution of these 
models named Internal Political Forces constitutes an abstraction from the 
concrete reality and, as a subjective and particular construction of the author, 
it has a high degree of generalization and, with this, a high probability of criti-
cism. In other words, when conforming IPF typologies, the aim is to study the 
characteristic features of a set that seeks to determine types and/or systems 
of power, typographic characters in a systematic way based on geopolitics, 
development and integration.
Finally, the difficulty of building class coalitions in South America is 
confirmed, mainly due to profound social inequality, divergence of interests 
and historical formation of power blocs. Therefore, the conformation of the 
terminology of Internal Political Forces was given opportunity, since, when 
working with this concept, principles and guidelines can be concatenated, 
which, at first, constitute a “political, economic and social orchestra with ele-
ments of varied fields” (Vadell; Carvalho 2014, 103, our translation). The con-
tradiction that may occur within the IPF is nothing more than the existing 
contradiction within the States, whose institutional structure is an arena of 
interests´ struggle.
In this way, it can be seen that South America is at a crossroads due 
to the crises and contradictions of socio-political models and, “subsequently, 
whether neoliberalism was in force or not as a hegemonic ideological body af-
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ter the 2001 crisis in the region” (Vadell; Carvalho 2014, 76, our translation):
It emerges from a crisis in its balance of payments from 1999 to 2009, 
amortized by reversing the deterioration of the terms of the trade, and from 
2010, it entered a cyclical period of expansion of foreign capital inflows, 
where the axis of world economic growth moves from central countries 
to East Asia, in particular China, and peripheral countries. This situation 
opens a window of opportunity and a new perspective for the region 
(Martins 2011, 273-274, our translation).
From this window of opportunity, it is essential to understand the In-
ternal Political Forces from a geopolitical, developmental and integrationist 
basis, and their correlation of power with the External Political Forces. Each 
insertion model proposes relations between the different fractions of class 
and the State in a given project, which can be determined, in the South Amer-
ican case, in three conceptions: exogenist privatism, seasonal hybridism and 
popular nationalism.
Exogenist Privatism
Exogenist privatism is a political aspect and a social and economic ide-
ology that tends to value private initiative, private property and privatizations, 
mainly with the sale and management of national assets to external sectors. It 
is guided and conducted directly by the international private business sectors, 
whose “national entrepreneur should associate with the international or com-
pete with him obligatorily” (Traspadini 2014, 40-41, our translation).
Therefore, it is a privatism of exogenous origin/influence, which devel-
ops from themes established outside the national spaces of South American 
countries, and whose national economies are totally guided by globalization 
and the interests of the great centers of power that come from the outside. 
Basically, it is based on three pillars: the scarcity of goods and resources must 
be managed by private transnational institutions; international capital is the 
social instrument that facilitates and moves the system; and any institution 
that inhibits the globalized rational market must be limited (Vadell; Carvalho 
2014, 82).
Thus, there is not only a prerogative of selling state assets and favoring 
the cosmopolitan market, but a priority, implicit or explicit, of strengthening 
private activities managed by sectors outside the South American countries, 
whose effectiveness and efficiency may or may not take into account the real 
needs of national economies. “The theorists of this idea have taken on a prag-
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matic claim to capitalism. Presenting globalization as an inexorable path that 
required greater openness, efficiency and competitiveness” (Katz 2016, 99, 
our translation). In other words, it is not only privatism that is encapsulated in 
an internal organic transformation with changes in political relations, in the 
productive and social organization under the liberal order, but the unrestrict-
ed denationalization at the expense of a globalized market with a predomi-
nance of international and transnational capitals.
The influence of a liberal trend can be seen in the lines that corre-
spond to the basic nucleus of exogenist privatism. Within the set of Internal 
Political Forces, exogenist privatism includes groups that converge with each 
other, establishing blocks of power that pass through each other, influencing 
each other reciprocally, but are based on the valorisation of exogenous private 
initiative. 
Seasonal Hybridism
Seasonal hybridism is characteristic of the Internal Political Force that 
comes from different political and economic natures, having two or more 
sides that manifest themselves in a determined period and conjuncture, in 
addition to performing isochronous movements in contradiction both in 
terms of their own segmentation, and in relation to other forces. It is the 
crossing of several flows of power that are seasonally interrelated, occurring 
at a specific time and that, subsequently, engenders a new configuration of 
partially or totally different currents. The proximity (hybridism) between the 
State and financial capital is an example, whose dialectical relationship pre-
sents a movement sometimes contrary to the principle of the self-regulated 
market, with different levels of state intervention, but which does not aban-
don all the measures proposed by liberal orthodoxy nor the links of States to 
the international capitalist system.
 Seasonal hybridism favors a pragmatic adaptation to the demands of 
the conjuncture, and therefore incorporates formulas that contain multiple 
elements, without defining a clear primacy; in one moment, they advocate 
social progressivism, in another, a liberal progression, “they tend to call for 
strengthening the market and the state, reinforcing centralization and de-
centralization, promoting the public and private, and developing austere and 
active policies” (Katz 2016, 143, our translation). In South America, it is a mo-
dality of projects periodically adopted by elites, the high bureaucracies and/or 
the capitalist groups of these countries, whose defense tunes in to the damag-
ing consequences of certain models, but accepts the criteria of capitalist eter-
nity as the only possible mode of production. Therefore, “at the conclusion 
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of a failed experience, social amnesia emerges that makes some forget that 
failure, but at the same time the conditions are prepared to repeat the experi-
ment” (Ouriques apud Katz 2016, 177, our translation).
 However, a variable of the Internal Political Force that was called sea-
sonal hybridity remains constant: the struggle between fractions of capital, 
but which, in a sense, converge the proposals to incorporate greater state reg-
ulation into neoliberal capitalism, in order to stabilize its functioning; in other 
words, a harmonious relationship between capital and social. In other words, 
there is a wide range of possibilities in the IPF called seasonal hybridity, justi-
fied by the fact that it incorporates different ideologies, theories and political 
practices, constituting itself as the most heterogeneous IPF. Therefore, sea-
sonal hybridity is the IPF that most often has changes in its political, econom-
ic and ideological directions, since it adds a multiplicity of correspondences 
presented in this study. Because of this, the power blocks compete and coop-
erate with each other within the state’s institutional framework, based on the 
various flows of power that are seasonally interrelated in the struggle between 
the different fractions of capital.
 
Popular Nationalism
Popular nationalism is considered an ideology or idealism that exalts 
and prioritizes the national state as a political body for the management and 
safeguarding of national interests, leading citizens to resume some of the 
traditions and founding principles of their South American countries that 
arouse sympathy and popular affection. This IPF is considered to be the an-
tonym of globalist cosmopolitanism, since the latter generates the loss of the 
concept of nation and separates the social concerns of the population from 
substantive decisions. We emphasize the prioritization of the popular term 
over the populist; however, both have a converging character when related to 
the definition of Laclau (2013), that the construction of populism would be a 
process of democratic demand in a historic moment of popular rupture.
 It is essential to emphasize that there are numerous contradictory 
manifestations of national revival, such as xenophobia, elitist projects of na-
tional accumulation, sub-imperialist policies of oppression, among others. 
In this way, it is worth emphasizing that the expression highlighted is that 
of popular resistance at the nationalist level, which is constituted as a model 
guided by a political will that expresses the power of popular social forces, 
linked to the state power system, and that they share with it conducting the 
development process of the productive forces.
 However, the realization of popular nationalism requires the creation 
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of sustainable bases for the expansion of the economic, social, political and 
cultural empowerment of its peoples, with the necessary condition of “facing 
its structural problems of internal exclusion (poverty and misery in various 
forms) and external (periphery)” (Martins 2011, 273-274).
Anyway, if we really want to build a national-popular project [...] the 
decisive intellectual task is to overcome the “mental blackout” that so many 
limitations imposed on the university and political environment [...]. In this 
context, we may or may not share skepticism about theoretical shortcomings 
in programs designed to overcome dependency and underdevelopment, 
but we have no right to forget and even less to change the terms of the 
debate of past decades (Ouriques 2014, 198, our translation).
This configuration is the most complex and misunderstood at the re-
gional level, since the experiences of popular nationalism in South America 
are routinely sabotaged, undermined and prevented, both by contrary IPF, 
and by EPF who see in this current the impossibility of disseminating their 
experiences. practices and ideals. Therefore, popular nationalism appears as 
the most homogeneous of the IPF, since it proposes to be the anti-system, 
a current contrary to the prevailing precepts and, therefore, it needs more 
cohesive and convergent spheres of domination. Still, all of these blocks are 
aligned to the prioritization of the management of the national state through 
the popular route, to a lesser or greater degree.
 These three typifications presented consist of distinct geoeconomic 
projects in South America, verified from an empirical analysis of the main 
power groups present in the region in the period between 2001-2020. Ob-
viously, such systematization is susceptible to modifications, since there is a 
transformative and constant mutability of reality, which influences the endog-
enous political power blocks in this complex and dynamic power geometry.
From independence to the General Peace Agreement (1975 - 1992)
In the same way that a brief theoretical systematization about IPF in 
South America was carried out, the External Political Forces (EPF) are defined 
as: 
exogenous forces that seek to establish and exercise power, control and 
intervention through centrifugal forces, preventing agents from moving 
away from the gravitational orbit of their irradiation center. Unlike the 
Internal Political Forces, the External Political Forces need an external agent 
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to exercise power, acting from outside to inside the system, that is, it is a 
type of force exerted on this system. Routinely, the EPF form commitments 
with certain IPF, which start to take decisions established and referenced 
to the first ones; i.e., the External Political Forces always aim to influence 
the Internal Political Forces that best reproduce their internal system of 
accumulation of power and wealth (Rodrigues 2020a, 122, our translation).
Once again, Fiori (2014, 30) clarifies the issue by stating that 
these great powers collectively protect themselves, preventing the 
emergence of new leading states and economies, by the monopolization 
of arms, currency and finance, information and technological innovation. 
For this reason, the emergence of an emerging power is always a factor of 
destabilization and change in the world system, because its rise threatens 
the monopoly of established powers (Fiori 2014, 30, our translation).
The study of External Political Forces in South America will focus on 
the main external agents in the region in the 21st century, the United States 
and China, who intensify a kaleidoscope of power projections that directly 
influence the correlation of IPF. 
 With regard to the performance of the EPF of the United States in 
South America, an unprecedented scenario is presented: the relative disen-
gagement of the United States in the face of its immediate strategic environ-
ment through a power vacuum originated by the attacks of September 11, 
since there was a redirecting of economic and military efforts to the Middle 
East and fighting the War on Terror.
Associated at first with the unilateral attitudes of George W. Bush, the 
attacks had a broader context: the contestation of hegemonic domination, 
whose military supremacy could not be fought, but whose society had 
fissures. To explore these fissures, the focus of 9/11 was on symbols of the 
country’s social and economic power (the twin towers of the World Trade 
Center in New York) and strategic-political (Pentagon and public buildings 
in Washington, DC) (Pecequilo 2012, 20, our translation).
This event provided two facts that would substantially characterize 
American policy in the Bush administration (2001-2009) and in the begin-
ning of the 21st century: the systematization of the Patriot Act and the in-
tensification of the Project for the New American Century. Both emerge as a 
result of the 2001 attacks and influence, directly or indirectly, the domestic 
and foreign policy of the United States, enabling a reinterpretation of their 
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role in the international system.
 Aligned to this factor, since its election, the Bush administration in-
dicated a significant rhetoric of unilateralism (Pecequilo 2012, 19-20), a fact 
that, in line with the attacks of September 11 and the window of opportunity 
for greater assertiveness in the military international plan justified by the fight 
against terrorism, enabled the activation of a project that appeared in neocon-
servative think tanks of the Republican Party in the 1990s, exerting a strong 
influence in the military sector and in the foreign policy of the president. The 
Project for the New American Century (PNAC) consisted of implementing a 
full spectrum dominance of the United States, consolidating and expanding 
its hegemony in the international system as the only superpower,
and, although it sometimes hesitated, kept the United States in a perpetual 
wartime footing, a forever war, war on terror, formalized in 2001, with 
Congressional authorization, to fight an invisible, unidentified, nameless 
and parameterless enemy, it continuity and escalating, unconstitutionally, 
the extrajudicial attacks and murders of terrorists or alleged terrorists, 
using the targeted killing tactic (Bandeira 2016, 93-94, our translation).
Despite these factors, the central criterion in the international action 
of the Bush administration has placed South America outside Washington’s 
radar (Colombo; Frechero 2012, 190-191), which, in Kelly’s (1997, 190, our 
translation) view, “political vacuum in Latin America pose potential threats 
to the United States”. In line with this view, this vacuum of relative power 
enabled the rise of different actors in the region during this period, both in-
ternally and externally. Soon,
the absence of positive policies in the region after the 1990s offensive, the 
difficulty in accommodating emerging bilateral partners, the economic 
crisis and the paralysis of an increasingly polarized political and social 
system in Washington are indicators of the weakening of presence in the 
hemisphere. And, even more, a loss of spaces that extends to different 
geopolitical scenarios and to the processes of global deconcentration of 
power (Pecequilo 2012, 54-55, our translation).
The last years of the Bush administration were marked by the outbreak 
of the 2008 financial crisis, a paradigmatic tipping point within the United 
States and throughout the international system. This event encouraged the 
rhetoric of the hegemonic refoundation of the United States with the elec-
tion of Barack Obama (2009-2017), modifying the American foreign policy 
and, concomitantly, its relationship with South America (Pecequilo 2012, 25). 
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Thus, although the attempt at global governance based on the full spectrum 
domain of the United States has continued and even intensified, there is a 
return of geostrategic direction to its immediate surroundings, through dif-
ferent actions in the economic field and, more sharply, in the military.
The Obama administration’s action basically consisted of an attempt 
to petrify the world order and implement totalitarian domination of the Unit-
ed States, corroborating with its predecessor, since it sought “full-spectrum 
dominance, ardently sought after the decomposition of the Soviet Union” 
(Bandeira 2016, 145, our translation). This full spectrum domination aims to 
conquer strategic positions and to condition wars in search of markets and/
or access to natural resources, even if it includes direct interference in other 
countries through regime change operations. In addition, such global govern-
ance is directly related to the project The New American Century, adapting it 
to the new imperatives of the international system and adapting it to the new 
types of war.
It should be noted that the year 2008, identified here as a mark of 
American recovery, coincides with the outbreak of the global economic crisis 
in developed countries, further reinforcing the concept that the United States’ 
EPF in South America gains strength as an outlet  for its economic tensions. 
That is, they do not emerge from a constructive policy for the continent or that 
aimed at deepening collaboration, but rather from a need to preserve the zone 
of hemispheric influence and contain the advance of new poles of power in 
this region and on a global scale (Pecequilo 2013, 112).
 The revaluation of South American countries on the global geopo-
litical board, such as Brazil and Venezuela, and regions such as the South 
Atlantic, has a relationship directly proportional to the adjustment of US EPF 
in the face of new regional and global phenomena. In other words, the greater 
the margin of autonomy of these and other states, the greater the chances of 
clashing interests with hegemony.
Faced with this scenario, North American reactions to the expansion of 
emerging markets in South America (and also in Africa and the South 
Atlantic). Began in a more systematic way in 2008, reaching greater 
intensity from 2009, with the arrival of Barack Obama to power in the 
White House. Obama not only continued the policies launched by George 
W. Bush in the geopolitical field, he also included geoeconomic components 
in the containment agenda of Brazil and China. Stallings (2008) points out 
that even though the Brazilian and Chinese stance is not confrontational in 
the face of hegemony, the fact that their projection of power started to clash 
with the North American one in the economic and in the political-strategic 
dimension imposed a need for a response by the United States (Pecequilo 
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2013, 112, our translation).
Therefore, the action of the United States consists of preventing the 
emergence of a possible power, as well as preventing any hostile power from 
dominating or exercising any type of influence, a “regional stability goal, 
which seeks to prevent threats to the vital interests of the United States in 
the face of ‘destabilizing countries’ in the region” (Bruckmann 2011, 207, our 
translation). To this end, they maintain mechanisms to dissuade potential 
competitors from aspiring to a regional or global role, intervening political-
ly, militarily and economically. Specifically for South America, the objectives 
of the US hemispheric strategy are to maintain its supremacy and military 
presence, reducing the military forces in the countries of the region; spread 
the broad economic liberalization agenda, through bilateral or regional agree-
ments; dominance over the hemisphere’s resources and markets; oppose the 
Chinese expansion and the rise of Brazil in the region, undermining its pro-
jects (MERCOSUR, UNASUR and BRICS).
The increase in Brazilian prestige and energy issues (the pre-salt reserves in 
Brazil and in the South Atlantic) lead to the reactivation of the Fourth Fleet 
of the South Atlantic, the continuity of Plan Colombia and the pressure on 
the Triple Border, considered a zone of terrorist risk. The reactivation of the 
Fourth Fleet responds to the Chinese and Indian advances in Latin America, 
and to the increase in military cooperation between Venezuela and Russia 
(and the approach of Venezuela to Iran). Further on, the constitution of 
the UNASUR Security Council (CSD) becomes a source of concern for the 
Americans (Pecequilo 2012, 53-54, our translation).
As stated by Fiori (2007; 2014), the projection of power of any and all 
hegemonic countries in the international system, historically, encompasses a 
synchronic dichotomy between the power of weapons and currencies, that is, 
military power and economic power. With regard to the United States’ Exter-
nal Political Forces in post-Cold War South America, this duality can be seen 
explicitly in terms of economic power, exemplified in the FTAA and other 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA’s) as the TPP, TTIP and TISA, and implicit in 
military power, via the realization of the so-called hybrid war (Korybko 2018; 
Rodrigues 2020b). 
On the other side of the international balance of power, South Amer-
ica is considered a geostrategic region for China at the beginning of the 21st 
century. As Tsai and Liu (2012) point out, since initiatives such as the visit 
of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, in 2001 in Chile, and Presi-
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dent Hu Jintao’s two visits to the continent, in 20042 and 2008, China has 
been proclaiming the South-South cooperation and preparing the ground for 
strengthening interregional exchanges: “in just over a decade, China migrates 
from almost absence to the main position in economic relations with LAC” 
(Vadell and Neves 2018, 208, our translation). In other words, these facts 
placed South America as one of the fundamental geopolitical spaces for the 
Chinese External Political Forces.
Still in 1999, the Chinese government launched a strategy, together 
with the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade (China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade - CCPIT), called “going out” 
or “going global” (Shambaugh 2013, 174). In general, it has consisted of a 
foreign investment policy, encouraged and carried out by the state, aimed at 
expanding and intensifying the internationalization process of Chinese com-
panies (Economy; Levi 2014, 49), making them competitive to operationalize 
and reach global markets. Thus, the key part of the Going Out strategy con-
sists of “financial support by the CDB and the China Export-Import Bank 
(CHEXIM), at least when it comes to the activities of large state-owned and 
state supported firms that make up the bulk of China’s overseas foreign direct 
investment (FDI)” (Gallagher 2016, 51).
In 2001, this policy was incorporated into the 10th Five-Year Plan 
(2000-2005), based on five objectives: to increase Chinese investments 
abroad; diversification of production; rationalization of administrative pro-
cesses (with an increase in the level and quality of projects); improvement of 
financial channels for the national market; and promotion of Chinese brands 
in international markets, mainly American and European (Leite and Ramos 
2016, 169-170).
By the early 1990s, there was a conscious government policy launched to 
encourage Chinese commercial firms to “go out” and for Chinese localities 
and organizations to more generally “go global”. The encouragement 
to Chinese companies did not really begin to materialize until around 
2007, but by the mid-2000s considerable international initiatives were 
being launched by a wide variety of Chinese organizations, localities, and 
individuals (Shambaugh 2013, 5).
Another determining feature is that this trajectory of reforms, coupled 
2 “In 2004, according to Johnson and Wasson, the Chinese President Hu Jintao announced 
an investment plan for the region and the interest in increasing the country’s trade with Latin 
America. At that time, attention was already focused on the Southern part of the continent- 
Brazil, Chile and Argentina- later expanding even more” (Pecequilo 2013, 109).
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with the increase in value chains and the growing technological update, final-
ly allows China to be admitted to the WTO at the end of 2001, after years of 
intense negotiations, having to adapt to some rules of the private market with 
an unprecedented commercial opening, although with strong control over the 
exchange rate (Vadell 2011, 99). In return, it would benefit from ample access 
to Western markets (Sevares 2015, 27). Therefore, such an event caused a 
huge jump in the volume of Chinese foreign trade, extending its integration 
to globalization and contributing decisively to an expansive cycle of the world 
economy that would last until 2008.
 Likewise, Sino-South American economic relations have been inten-
sifying since 2001. As previously stated, both the entry into the WTO and the 
State visits in 2004 and 2005 gave rise to the signing of trade, investment and 
cooperation agreements in different areas (Vadell;,Ramos, Neves 2016, 81; 
Leite and Ramos 2016, 172-173). In addition, the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-
2010) established an imperative to increase aid to other developing countries, 
including as a way of collaborating with the going global strategy: “In this 
sense, it is important to bear in mind that Chinese cooperation is governed 
by the rule of mutual benefit and shared gain towards aid recipients” (Brutto 
2018, 115, our translation).
 With the tipping point brought about by the 2008 financial crisis, both 
China’s domestic and foreign policy have undergone considerable changes, 
triggering a new stage after the long cycle of beneficial globalization since 
the 1970s. In a sense, such mutations are perceived as an opportunity for 
the Chinese domestic economy, since the vulnerability of international distur-
bances alerted the Chinese State to the need to build a more robust domestic 
consumer market (Niu 2013, 203), in addition to providing vigorous counter-
cyclical fiscal policy, sustaining the level of economic activity (Naughton 2015) 
based mainly on the intensive use of labor, as the country approaches the 
status of “middle income” (Jaguaribe 2011, Perkins 2013).
 Between 2008 and 2016, China has been undergoing substantial 
changes, with lower rates of economic expansion added to policies and guide-
lines that aim at more “sustainable” growth. This explains, in a sense, the 
lower Chinese rhythm, with a new paradigm called “New Normal” (Naughton 
2017, 21; Perkins 2013; Pereira and Ribeiro 2016), where exports and the for-
eign market lose relative centrality in the guidelines of the government in the 
face of expanding consumption and domestic demand. Such targeting for the 
domestic market, present even in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), helps 
to understand the drastic cooling of commodity prices (Naughton 2015), gen-
erating consequences for the global and regional dynamics by closing a be-
nign exogenous cycle for South American terms of trade (Pereira and Ribeiro 
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2016).
 Therefore, when going through the stages of regionalization and glo-
balization, China also systematically developed deeper trade, investment and 
diplomatic relations with South America in the period from 2001 to 2020, 
showing a growing political and economic interdependence between these 
countries in relation to China, called hybrid geoeconomics, considering that 
it consists of:
use of economic instruments based on a multiform and asymmetric duality 
that, when used in certain countries or regions, present both advantages 
and disadvantages. It is a process of economic activity with geopolitical 
purposes, carried out by the combination of elements that bring both 
development and dependence, progress and backwardness, bonuses 
and burdens, characterizing, expressing or manifesting themselves by 
composition of disparate, ambiguous elements and in different political-
economic modalities (Rodrigues 2020a, 188).
Summing up, after the definition of both the Internal Political Forces 
and the External Political Forces, as well as their empirical visualization in 
South America in the 21st century from the empirical-deductive methodolo-
gy, it is proposed to discuss the central objective of this work: the theoretical 
construction of Competitive-Cooperative Triangles (TCCs) of power in inter-
national relations. 
Competitve-Cooperative Triangles of Power
Power in International Relations
The Internal Political Forces and the External Political Forces are 
configurations of power in international relations. In the specific case of the 
countries of South America, the United States and China, it allows the evalu-
ation of different geostrategies in different scenarios, based on a materialist 
dialectic that changes over time. Consequently, the power variable is essential 
for the study of this set of selected countries.
 There is a dialectical relationship between the state, the Internal Po-
litical Forces and the External Political Forces; both influence each other, ex-
erting pressures that modify the countries’ internal circumstances, regional 
arrangements and the international system itself. Thus, it is essential to study 
such concepts in the practical South American and world reality, since the 
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proposed model engenders competition, contradiction and accumulation of 
power and wealth, basic characteristics of the capitalist interstate system and 
that, intuitively, directly influence the actors cited.
 Consequently, determining the state as an aggregating element of 
power in the topics presented, it is essential to theoretically rationalize power 
itself. In the scope of international relations, this is one of the most intensely 
debated topics. Since Machiavelli (2012), when demonstrating that the accu-
mulation of power was essential for the Prince, with the permanent prepara-
tion for war through political resilience (virtú) or luck (fortune), the different 
political actors aim to quantify and qualify capabilities and the possibility of 
exercising power. Other classics of international relations also examined the 
theme: according to Morgenthau (2003), power is defined as the strength of 
a man over the minds and actions of other men; for Aron (2002), in the most 
general sense, power is the capacity that a political unit has to impose its will 
on others; in Nye’s view (2004, 2), power is “the ability to influence others to 
get the outcomes one wants”; according to Lukes (1980), there would be four 
fundamental approaches to power in political philosophy3.
 Therefore, power is the ability, the force that acts on a certain reality; 
it is all the probability of imposing one’s ambition in a social relationship 
against resistance, whatever the basis of that probability; it is the ability to im-
pose your will, which results in something concrete or subjective. Thus, the 
power for action is studied, for creation, construction or destruction; when 
power is oriented towards an objective, it is used to modify the structure, the 
existing relationships.
 Power, state and class make up the main relationship of forces within 
the international system. The Internal Political Forces guide the power of the 
state within its institutional core, and the way they extend outwards. In other 
words, a strong state is one that exercises its power, both externally and inter-
nally, being a partially autonomous entity that requires a social class whose 
direct interests are at the service of the entity, both by the administrators of 
the state and by the state bureaucracy. In those states where the state appara-
tus is weak, public administrators do not intervene in the role of coordinating 
power from a complex of political forces.
 Still, it is important to emphasize that the state and power, in them-
selves, are abstractions that gain concreteness from the dispute of different so-
3 Such as: 1) substantialist, that refers to means, like exercise or dominance; 2) subjective, 
related to capacities, the competence of each player to exercise dominance and legitimation; 
relational, linked to direct dominance and the capacity to influence players in a different man-
ner, if it was not in a position of control; and 4) structural, linked to the constraint, and control 
in decision making context.
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cial classes. When adding the perspective of the social classes - in the present 
work identified as Internal Political Forces - it is ratified that the unique and 
exclusive perspective of the states hides the role of the classes in the strategies 
of power. The role of IPF is a conditioning factor in the strategies assumed by 
the states, as well as in the orientation of specific power strategies. In other 
words, the state and power correspond to an abstraction whose concreteness 
is realized by social classes and/or Internal Political Forces; its definitions are 
always concrete, conditioned to the existence of the class struggle. 
 In this same line of reasoning, Fiori’s definition of power (2007, 16-
19; 2014, 18-22) is one of the most interesting. According to the author, “power 
is a relationship that is constituted and defined, tautologically, by the dispute 
and the continuous struggle for power itself” (Fiori 2014, 18, our translation). 
Therefore, by definition, power is asymmetrical4, relative5, heterostatic6, flow7 
and expansive8, in which the international system consists of a shock of wills 
constituted by relations between states aiming at the accumulation of power 
and wealth.
 For the scope of the present research, the definitions of triangular 
power and systemic power are the most elucidating, mainly with regard to 
the further theoretical formulation on the so-called Competitive-Cooperative 
Triangle (CBT). For Fiori (2014, 19), triangular power is one in which:
every power relationship involves at least two internal vertices and an 
external limit that can be represented in the form of a point or an external 
vertex, where the intersection between P1 and P2 occurs, for example. In 
this sense, it can be said that the limit of any and all Pn power units, always 
4 “If all had the same power, there would be no struggles or ‘power relations’” (Fiori 2014, 18, 
our translation).
5 “Power involves a hierarchy and constant tug of war between one vertex that holds more 
power than another, and other that, for certain, will have less power. If one vertex increases its 
level of freedom, another will lose, inevitably in comparison to the one which expanded” (Fiori 
2014, 18, our translation).
6 “Any of these power variations always generates a somewhat immediate reaction of the 
prejudiced parties, in order to reinstate and sustain the power correlation, pertaining to the 
previous situation and initial change” (Fiori 2014, 18, our translation).
7 “Power is an action in movement and it only exists when it is exercised in a continuum. There 
is no way to conceive an immutable power, or to conceive logically the possibility of an inactive 
or neutral power” (Fiori 2007, 17, our translation).
8 “Each unity of power (P1, P2, P3 etc), exercises a competitive pressure on itself, and all 
of these units exercise the same pressure one in relation to another. As a consequence, the 
system, as a whole, also expands in a continuous manner. (Fiori 2014, 19). Still, “therefore, in 
this type of system, all sovereign powers are and will always be expansionists, proposing itself, 
in the last instance, to conquer an even greater global power” (Fiori 2007, 18, our translation).
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established by another Pn-1 power unit, will have the same characteristics 
as Pn, and therefore will also have its limit drawn by one more unit of 
power Pn-2, and so on infinitely, with respect to Pn-3, Pn-4 etc. (Fiori 2014, 
19, our translation).
In other words, the power relationship has always at least one and 
any boundary, since the power of P1 exerts influence to the point where the 
power of P2 begins, a space in which it is not possible to obtain effectiveness. 
Furthermore, any cut that is made of power consists of a triangle, since each 
and every link has a relationship between more than two actors, characteriz-
ing, therefore, power with innumerable borders and power relations between 
innumerable triangles. Thus, “all human relations involve a ‘triangular struc-
ture’, minimal and irreducible, and at the same time asymmetric and hierar-
chical” (Fiori 2016, 15, our translation).
 Still, with regard to systemic power, Fiori ratifies the impossibility of 
“thinking about a unit of power without logically assuming the existence of a 
set of other units of power that multiply in the form of triangles that suppose 
other triangles, and so on” (Fiori 2014, 19, our translation). That is, P involves 
a system of P’s, which form infinite conflicting, competitive, overlapping tri-
angles, whose power relationship is infinitely elastic and timeless.
If power relations were binary and closed on themselves, they would 
become a zero-sum game and would tend to disappear in an autophagic 
way. This only does not happen because power is triangular and systemic, 
and all of its units can expand outside themselves, through the conquest of 
power or some portion of power from the other units of the system (Fiori 
2014, 19, our translation).
Fiori theorizes a phenomenology of power that instigates his study 
within the framework of international relations, focusing on how his logic be-
haves in the interstate system. It is interesting to note that it is configured as 
an unprecedented and complex line of reasoning and that, although abstract, 
allows for multiple interpretations in an attempt to analyze concrete reality. 
Conceptual definition of Competitive-Cooperative Triangles of 
Power in International Relations
Based on what was exposed about the Internal Political Forces in 
South America (e.g: exogenist privatism, seasonal hybridity and popular na-
tionalism), the global External Political Forces (e.g: the United States and Chi-
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na) and the theorizing about the triangular and systemic power, it is possible 
to define Competitive-Cooperative Triangles. They are geometric structures of 
power formed by three vertices of Political Forces, three sides of competitive 
or cooperative relations and three internal political angles, whose dispute to 
equal, overcome or gain geopolitical and geoeconomic benefits presents an 
asymmetric, hierarchical and, obviously, competitive or cooperative triangu-
lation. 









Relationship Side (CRS A)
Competitive-Cooperative 
Relationship Side (CRS B)
Competitive-Cooperative 





Internal Political Angle 
(IPAr)
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
In the table above, the Competitive-Cooperative Triangle presents a 
structure in which the representation of the Political Force Vertex (PFV 1) 
establishes a Competitive-Cooperative Relationship Side (CRS A) with the 
Political Force Vertex (PFV 2), which constitutes a Competitive-Cooperative 
Relationship Side (CRS C) with the Political Force Vertex (PFV 3), ending the 
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triangulation by the Competitive-Cooperative Relationship Side (CRS B) with 
the Political Force Vertex (A). Likewise, each Vertex has an Internal Political 
Angle (VPF 1-IPA a; VPF 2-IPA b; VFP 3-IPA r), representing the internal dis-
putes of forces of each vertex, in addition to being subject to change according 
to variations in the Sides of Competitive-Cooperative Relations.
 It is interesting to note the justification for the design of CCTs. A 
priori, the correlation between competition and cooperation in the same the-
oretical conception may seem a logical incongruity. Such a fact is not only 
possible, but also rational, when considering two factors: the first, in the in-
ternational system, there is no power vacuum and, since power is flow, action 
and movement, exercised continuously, there is no possibility of idealizing a 
static, disabled or neutral power. In other words, if there is any space for the 
exercise of power in any of its forms, it will be readily occupied by some pow-
er. The second factor is that the triangular power is about three-point chains, 
in which the relationship, competitive or cooperative, between two vertices 
(VFP 1 and VFP 2) forms one side (LRC A), but reflects and influences, direct-
ly or indirectly, in competitive or cooperative terms, in the relation of the other 
vertices as a whole (VFP 1 and VFP3, with LRC B; and VFP 2 and VFP3, with 
LRC C).
Figure 2: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle – Effects and Reflexes
Source: Author’s elaboration.
Another abstraction that can be performed from a CCT is related to its 
time frame. In other words, since the nature of the international system, like 
that of states themselves, is a constant flow of competitions, cooperation and 
transformations, an intertemporal triangular relationship changes over time, 
whether in the correlation of forces between the Political Forces, in Com-
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petitive-Cooperative Relations between them and in their Internal Political 
Angles, as shown in figure 3. 
Figure 3: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle – Intertemporal Relationship
Source: Author’s elaboration.
This is an interesting analysis tool if one is looking to perform com-
parative analysis of Competitive-Cooperative Triangles over a given period. In 
addition, there is not only the finding of links between the same actors in dif-
ferent periods of time, but, simultaneously, one or two different actors within 
this intertemporality, as shown in figure 4. 





By mathematical definition, triangles are classified based on their side 
measurements. Similarly, by transplanting this identity to the plane of inter-
national relations and, when considering each side of the triangle as a com-
petitive or cooperative relationship between specific political forces (internal 
or external), the asymmetries of power therefore mean different sides of the 
triangles. That is, each vertex, at a given historical, spatial and relational mo-
ment, from the geopolitical, developmental and integrationist perspectives, 
has greater, lesser or analogous strength when compared to the other vertex-
(s), and so on. 
Figure 5: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle – Power Math
Source: Author’s elaboration.
Therefore, a classification can be made based on these asymmetries: 1) 
scalene competitive-cooperative triangle is one that has all different sides, that 
is, the asymmetry of power is distinct in the three vertices and in the three 
internal political angles; 2) isosceles competitive-cooperative triangle is one 
that has two equal sides and, therefore, two vertices and two internal political 
angles have equivalent power; 3) equilateral competitive-cooperative triangle 
is one that has all equal sides, with internal political angles, therefore present-
ing axes of symmetry of power. 
The Empirics of Competitive-Cooperative Triangles in South Amer-
ica
In order to clarify these theoretical abstractions of power, it is possible 
to relate them to succinct examples of the present work presented so far. In 
the illustration below, the vertices of each triangle correspond to the Internal 
Political Forces in South America, at the top, and the global External Political 
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Forces, at the bottom. It is understood that each triangular relationship refers 
to a correlation of temporal and spatial forces, according to the material con-
ditions present in political-economic terms, with two vertices in order to pre-
vail the majority Political Force in the competitive or cooperative correlation, 
represented on the side of the triangle. In the case of the Privatist Political 
Force, the side of the most powerful triangle tends to prevail for the American 
Political Force, shifting its internal political angle to the right. Concomitantly, 
with the counterpart of the Nationalist Political Force, there is a tendency of 
convergence for China and a shift of the internal political angle to the left. 
For the Hybrid Political Force, both External Political Forces exert direct and 
indirect influence, keeping their internal political angles constant.
Figure 6: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle - Internal Political Forces in 
South America and Global  External Political Forces 
Source: Author’s elaboration.
It should be noted that the correlation of forces between the External 
Political Forces, whether to a greater or lesser extent, also affects the linkage 
of the third actor, the Internal Political Force, in benefit or not. Furthermore, 
the Internal (and External) Political Forces compete with each other, causing 
new triangular, endogenous and exogenous relationships to be formed. In 
figure 7, it is observed that at the domestic level, there are competitive dis-
putes between privatism and hybridism in country A, between hybridism and 
nationalism in country B, and between privatism and nationalism in country 
C, configuring endogenous competitive triangles of Internal Political Forces. 
Concomitantly, the dispute for the international system between the two great 
powers, the United States and China, shapes the competition of the External 
Political Forces. Since the internal and external plans of these competitive 
triangles have dialectical flows of influence, any change in one of the vertices 
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of any triangle changes the correlation of forces on the side of that same tri-
angle, as well as the internal political angles, changing, to a lesser or greater 
extent, the entire system. 
Figure 7: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle – Endogenous and Exoge-
nous Relationships
Source: Author’s elaboration.
Since the triangular relations are infinite, multiple forces could be 
added in the proposed scheme, even outside the sphere of the state. The aim 
here was to carry out a simplified systematization, in order to visualize the ge-
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opolitical and geoeconomic implications related to the Internal and External 
Political Forces, as well as their competitive-cooperative triangular relations. 
Figure 8: Competitive-Cooperative Triangle – Other Actors
Source: Author’s elaboration.
In the international system, all countries, regardless of their role in 
the global hierarchical structure, seek to increase their power and wealth. Al-
though they do not propose to increase their territories in geographic terms, 
they are all expansive. In this context, “the ‘competitive pressure’ of power 
is always a systemic pressure, because all ‘sovereign powers’ need to expand 
or defend themselves, even if it is simply to conserve the power they already 
have” (Fiori 2007, 17-18).
 From the systematization carried out on the CCTs, “the increase in 
power, freedom and equality of one of its three ends will imply loss of sov-
ereignty, autonomy and the difference of the other two ends” (Fiori 2016, 15, 
our translation), in which the most powerful vertex will continue to be the one 
that founds the rules of the game, the ethical-moral criterion and the political 
and economic arbitration, establishing and adapting to its interests the sides 
of the competitive and/or cooperative relations and the internal political an-
gles, in this incessant dispute geopolitics by global power.
 It is also worth noting that this theoretical analysis of the CCTs has 
a directly proportional relationship with the Latin expression “Inter duos lit-
igantes, tertius gaudens”: between two litigants, the third rejoices, that is, 
when two fight a third one takes advantage; “rather than getting in the middle 
of every fight, sometimes it is better to hold the coats of those who do” (Arrighi 
2007, 298). At the same time, it is inversely proportional to the theory of the 
balance of power: instead of aiming at supporting any of the vertices of power, 
it explores favorable periods of mutual hostility from the strongest vertices to 
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the achievement of predefined objectives. In other words, it is proposed that, 
although an actor is the weakest point of the triangular relationship, there 
are loopholes in the geometry of power that give rise to political assertiveness 
aiming at the accumulation of power and wealth.
 Analyzing the specific situation of South America in the triangular 
power relationship with the United States and China, the possibility of three 
different triangulations is perceived, from the definition of the three Internal 
Political Forces and the two External Political Forces. Obviously, these gen-
eralizations change even within the analyzed period (2001-2020), as well as 
in the relationship between the United States and China with each of the 
Internal Political Forces. Therefore, in order to simplify the example, a brief 
qualitative analysis of a triangulation (IPF, EPF 1 and EPF 2) will be carried 
out in the three periods of the time frame: 2001, 2008 and 2016, considered 
paradigmatic for both the international system and specific character of Si-
no-American relations with South America.
 Since 2001, the attacks on the twin towers and the presence in Eurasia 
with the War in Afghanistan/Iraq in the context of the Global War on Terror 
“undermined the centrality of the US and its currency in the global political 
economy, and strengthened the tendency towards the emergence of China as 
an alternative to US leadership in East Asia and beyond” (Arrighi 2007, 209). 
Concomitantly with the weakening of American unipolarity, it included Chi-
na’s entry into the WTO in 2001, in line with its Go Global policy, which led 
to greater economic and diplomatic participation on all geopolitical boards. 
In South America, the decline in the commercial, economic and political rel-
evance of the United States, and the strengthening of the Chinese presence 
“can also be largely attributed to the strengthening of the Pink Tide9 and the 
regional integration process” (Dominguez 2016, 135-136, our translation).
This dynamic favored an American retreat/distance and an advance/
strengthening of Chinese commercial relations in South America, allowing 
a moment of expansion of the IPF (to a lesser or greater degree depending 
on its characteristics) by taking advantage of the US power vacuum, benefit-
ing “The development of autonomous proposals, in which the United States 
is not inserted: they are autochthonous agendas and focused on interests 
and the improvement of South American conditions” (Carmo and Pecequilo 
2016, 58, our translation).
The 2008 financial crisis is a turning point for the three corners of 
9 Pink tide is an expression utilized in foreign policy analysis in the beginning of the 21st 
century to conceptualize the growing influence of the left in Latin America in the end of the 
1990s decade and the early 2000s, when heads of State linked to reformist parties from the 
left were elected.
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the triangulation, whose characteristics do not neglect the previous ones, but 
constitute new forms of power relations. In the United States, the initial focus 
on economic recovery is aligned with the counter-reaction/assertive resump-
tion in South America (Carmo and Pecequilo 2016, 71), seen in the attempts 
to sign the TPP and the relevance of the Pacific Alliance and other bilateral 
treaties; in China, there is a redirection of domestic policy (New Normal) and 
a slowdown in economic growth, which directly reverberates in the decrease 
in trade flows with South America, together with the intensification of invest-
ment flows and bilateral/multilateral treaties; for IPF in general, the substitu-
tion of high to low profile agendas is seen, intensified by the changes to liberal 
governments in the elections and with the growing emptying of autonomous 
regional leaders, causing the United States and China to resume a certain role 
(Carmo and Pecequilo 2016, 73).
In 2016, the general scenario underwent new transformations: the 
election of Donald Trump in the United States, focused on economic protec-
tionism and military interventionism (Rodrigues 2017), provided elements of 
constant instability in American domestic and foreign policy; the increasingly 
striking presence in the figure of Xi Jinping engendered a Chinese redirection 
in the international system, from the intensification of the role of the BRICS 
and the Belt and Road Initiative, and to the South American subcontinent 
with the second policy paper specific to the region; in South America, after 
a decade of advances in several political and economic aspects, there is a set 
of setbacks from a geostrategic point of view, in which the consequences are 
presented through the “loss of space and leadership, the increase of regional 
instability, the emptying of integration projects, the consolidation of China’s 
presence in South America and the deepening of the American hegemonic 
counter-reaction” (Carmo and Pecequilo 2016, 65-66, our translation).
 In general terms, analyzing the Sides of Competitive-Cooperative Re-
lations, the following parameters are visualized in the relationship between 
China - United States: in a context of “asymmetric bipolarity” (Stuenkel 2016, 
83-84), there is a pattern of cooperative coexistence (Kissinger 2011, 468-
469), since there is a perception that both need each other and are too big to 
be dominated and/or transformed; and competitive coexistence (Shambaugh 
2013, 73-74), in which, despite the interconnection in different areas, there 
has been an increase in competition in the economic, ideological, security 
and geopolitical levels in recent years, which could make South America “the 
theater of global disputes between Monroe and Mao’s heirs ”(León-Manriquez 
and Alvarez 2014, 24). In the United States - South America relationship, the 
imposition of the geopolitics of the Hybrid War can be seen, as seen in the 
previous sections, mainly with the resumption of the region on the American 
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geostrategic radar as of 2008. Regarding the relationship between China - 
South America, the permissiveness of Hybrid Geoeconomics is ratified, in 
which Beijing uses trade, investment and diplomacy with the intention of 
balancing regional and global dominance.
Final Remarks
This article intended to present a new epistemological formulation 
of power, the Competitive-Cooperative Triangles, backed by the correlations 
of Internal and External Political Forces in the South American case study. 
In this way, it is concluded that the Competitive-Cooperative Triangles estab-
lished by the United States - China - South America correlation are highly 
complex, giving rise to new projects and academic research that aim to ex-
plore the infinite possibilities of these triangulations of power in their multi-
ple disciplinary dimensions.
 As final considerations, we reaffirm that the balance of power trian-
gulation in South America starts to be disrupted when the subcontinent, tra-
ditionally in the sphere of influence of the US, is attracted by the Chinese 
magnetic pole, increasing concerns on the American side because it consists 
of a vital area for their regional security and stability. China has been increas-
ing its ties with South America, using multilateral institutions to restrict and 
dilute American power and influence, using “multilateralism” as a means of 
achieving “multipolarism” (Shambaugh 2013, 153).  China has also supported 
the advance of regional integration mechanisms, such as CELAC, seen by the 
United States in a hostile way, since the creation of the China - CELAC Forum 
intentionally excludes them. Such a geopolitical chessboard tends to become 
increasingly dynamic as the interests of the three vertices of power become 
more latent.
In so doing, Latin American leaders will not be operating in a vacuum. Latin 
America will have to navigate the China Triangle. At the top of the triangle 
tip is the United States, while China and Latin America form a new base of 
cooperation from left to right. But China has its own delicate relationship 
with the United States. The United States has a longstanding connection 
to the Americas. In addition to reforms at home, Latin American capitals 
will need to retool alliances with China to be more consistent with those 
reforms. At the same time, China’s new alliance with Latin America is seen 
as a challenge to the United States, a nation that has long considered the 
Americas its backyard. To be successful, then, Latin America’s reforms will 
have to operate in a manner that simultaneously builds on its relationships 
with China and the United States alike rather than picking one over the 
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other (Gallagher 2016, 3).
In such a way, South America is outlined as a sensibly geostrategic 
area in the medium term, visualizing “a revival of the region as a geopolitical 
and geoeconomic space” (Pecequilo 2013, 101), in which “concerns on Chi-
na’s rise and increasing pressures from US hard-liners could transform Latin 
America in a scenario of geopolitical dispute between the two great powers” 
(León-Manriquez and Alvarez 2014, 23-24).
Thus, analyzing the proposed theoretical framework, some conclu-
sions can begin to be drawn:
1) in triangular relations, both competition and cooperation provide 
opportunities for South American countries, by establishing benefits with the 
other vertex of power;
2) adding a geo-economic pattern to the geopolitical paradigm, new 
frontiers are opened for triangulations of power, which can benefit the region 
if the IFP outline objectives, goals and geostrategic plans;
3) for South America, the increase in exchanges with Beijing may in-
crease the bargaining power with Washington, changing the historical struc-
ture from boss to partner (Gallagher 2016, 176-177), based on the perception 
“that China could become an alternative to asymmetric interdependence with 
the United States, both in strategic and economic sectors” (Pecequilo 2013, 
108);
4) from the previous conclusion, it follows that this fact tends to arouse 
apprehensions on the part of the United States, considering the intensity ac-
quired by Sino-South American relations as dysfunctional to their interests in 
the region (Sevares 2015, 101);
5) in a geostrategic vision of South American autonomy, the region 
could take advantage of Sino-American regional and global competition by 
capitalizing and strengthening pragmatic ties with both parties, aiming at its 
socio-economic development as a strategic goal.
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ABSTRACT
In the 21st century, power projects in South America constitute disputes that com-
prise a dialectical correlation between Internal and External Political Forces. In this 
sense, this article aims to conduct an innovative debate based on the theoretical for-
mulation called Competitive-Cooperative Triangles of Power, taking the South Ameri-
can region as a case study. From a realist view of international relations and by using 
an empirical-deductive methodology, the objective is to achieve an epistemological 
construction regarding power in the international system, explaining the challenges 
and possibilities of the South American Internal Political Forces.
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